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GALINDO V. TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN
(decided May 13, 2004)
ERIC C. GOLDSTEIN*
If a tree falls in Brooklyn, does Manhattan have to pay for it?
To what extent should property owners advise people of potential
dangers on their property — or on someone else’s?  Justice Car-
dozo eloquently tried to shed light on the duty of care, by stating:
If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction
would commonly result, not negatively merely in with-
holding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an
injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to
go forward.  So the surgeon who operates without pay, is
liable though his negligence is in the omission to sterilize
his instruments; the engineer, through his fault is in the
failure to shut off steam; the maker of automobiles, at the
suit of some one other than the buyer, though his negli-
gence is merely in inadequate inspection.1
Property owners may be unaware, but they are faced with the di-
lemma of deciding when they have such a duty to go forward.  If
landowners are responsible for identifying potential danger spots,
how should courts determine such areas?  Should landowners be
subject to liability if their determinations prove to be incorrect?2
Courts must make these difficult and policy-laden decisions.  With-
out more direction from the courts or even the legislature, injured
parties may suffer harmful consequences.
In Galindo v. Town of Clarkstown, the New York State Court of
Appeals was asked to draw lines regarding landowner liability and
responsibility.3  This case stemmed from an unfortunate tragedy
that might have been avoided.  In a 4 to 3 decision, a divided court
* J.D., New York Law School, 2005.
1. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 167-68 (1928) (dis-
cussing privity of contract and the duty of care) (emphasis added).
2. Galindo v. Town of Clarkstown, 759 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (2d Dep’t 2002), aff’d, 2
N.Y.3d 633 (2004).
3. 2 N.Y.3d 633 (2004).
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upheld a summary judgment motion dismissing a complaint against
a landowner alleging that the landowner failed to warn of a danger-
ous condition on neighboring property.4  The court held that land-
owners are not obligated to protect or alert others from defective or
dangerous conditions on neighboring premises, unless the owner
contributed to or created the condition.5  In so holding, the court
set clear precedent that injured persons cannot sue property own-
ers for injuries stemming from adjacent properties.6  This case com-
ment argues that although the Court of Appeals accurately
interpreted the law, it too narrowly applied that interpretation to
the facts of this case, thereby creating an unclear subset of negli-
gence law.  The court should establish a clearer test to determine
whether property owners can be held liable for failing to warn of
dangerous conditions emanating from adjacent property.  Without
such a test, injured persons are precluded from any recovery, and
landowners may remain complacent in disclosing severe and hid-
den potential dangers that pose a threat to their property.
In Galindo, the controversy arose from a powerful storm that
swept through the Town of Clarkstown (the Town), located in
Rockland County, New York.7  The storm was so forceful that it
caused damage to a massive eighty-foot tree located on the Town’s
property, which was adjacent to Richard Clark’s property.8  Two
days later, Clark went to assess the destruction caused by the storm
and noticed that the damaged tree on the Town’s land was now on
an angle and “tilted toward” his property.9  Upon further inspec-
tion, he noticed that the roots of the tree had loosened.10  Al-
though Clark was alarmed by the possibility the tree might fall onto
his home or onto the road, he did not think the tree would fall
imminently.11  Clark and his wife neither moved out of their house,
4. Id. at 637.
5. Id. at 636-37.
6. Id. at 636.  The court, however, suggested that a duty may arise in situations
where the danger is more apparent to the property owner. Id. at 637; see infra text
accompanying note 40.
7. Galindo, 2 N.Y.3d at 634.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 635.
10. Id. at 634-35.
11. Id. at 637.
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nor moved their cars, even though, as Clark admitted, one of the
cars was in “a potential danger radius.”12
In an attempt to remedy the situation, Clark notified a Town
Highway Department employee who was working across the street
that the tree had been damaged.13  The employee did not ap-
proach the tree to view the damage, but directed Clark to report
the damaged tree to the Town Supervisor.14  Clark never received a
response from the Town Supervisor.15  Immediately after noticing
that the tree had tilted even more, Clark tried to contact the Town
Supervisor for a second time.16  Later that day, Jacqueline Galindo,
Clark’s housekeeper, arrived at his home.17  While Galindo was in-
side cleaning, Clark left the house to run errands.18  Clark noticed a
car parked behind his wife’s but did not approach it or see anyone
inside.19  While Clark was away from home, the Town’s damaged
tree fell onto the parked car.20  Galindo’s husband, who was inside
the car when the tree fell down, died as a result.21
Galindo brought a wrongful death action in New York Su-
preme Court, Rockland County, against Clark and the Town.22
Galindo alleged that Clark breached a duty to warn her of the dan-
gerous condition created by the damaged tree.23  Galindo settled
with the Town after the court denied the Town’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.24  However, the court disagreed with Galindo’s ar-
gument that Clark had a duty to warn and granted Clark’s motion
for summary judgment.  It held that Clark had no duty to warn of
conditions on property he did not own.25
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 635.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 638 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 635.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Galindo, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
24. Galindo, 2 N.Y.3d at 635-36 (discussing the procedural history of the case and
lower court decisions).
25. Id.
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On appeal, the Second Department of the Appellate Division
affirmed the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to Clark,
concluding that property owners do not have a duty to warn per-
sons on their property of dangerous conditions located outside
their property.26  The court did not impose upon landowners the
duty to determine whether an unsafe condition on an adjacent par-
cel of property might become an unsafe condition upon their own
land.27  Such an imposition, the court reasoned, would create an
“unreasonably onerous burden” upon landowners.28
Judge Ritter, writing for the dissent, stated that landowners
have a duty to warn those on their property of dangerous or defec-
tive conditions, regardless of whether danger emanates from that
property.29  The dissent supplied a “zone of danger” analysis in
which no distinction is made between the property from which the
danger emanates and the property on which the actual injury oc-
curs.30  Under this analysis, the focus is on landowners’ duty to warn
guests of known dangers on their property that may result in injury
or death if guests come within the “zone of danger.”31  Judge Ritter
pointed out that Clark contacted the Town several times to remedy
the defective tree and knew that the plaintiff’s husband’s car was
parked directly in the “anticipated fall line” of the tree, directly in
the “zone of danger.”32  These pressing concerns, the dissent said,
should have triggered a warning.33
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s deci-
sion.34  Simply restating the rule applied by the Appellate Division,
the court held that unless landowners produced or contributed to a
hazardous condition, landowners do not have a duty to warn others
of dangerous conditions emanating from neighboring premises.35
The court stated that without ownership or control over property, it
would be unfair to hold landowners liable for accidents resulting
26. Galindo, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 760 (Ritter, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Galindo, 2 N.Y.3d at 636.
35. Id. at 636-37.
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from a dangerous condition on neighboring property.36  In this
case, Clark neither owned nor controlled the property where the
tree was located, nor was he empowered to remove the tree.37  In
fact, if Clark had attempted to resolve the situation by personally
removing the tree, criminal liability might have been imposed.38
Thus, Clark had no duty to warn Galindo about the tree.39  The
court lessened the severity of its holding by indicating that liability
could be imposed upon landowners when risks from neighboring
property are so apparent to landowners, but not to guests, that a
warning needs to be given.40
Chief Judge Kaye, writing for the dissent, argued that the ma-
jority’s application of the duty of care standard imposed upon land-
owners was too narrow.41  According to Judge Kaye, courts deciding
cases involving injury from conditions on adjacent property should
employ the same test they would apply in any other negligence or
duty of care case, namely, what a reasonably prudent person would
do under similar circumstances.42  She further argued that the tech-
nical location of the dangerous condition, in this case the damaged
tree rooted in the Town’s property, should not be the main focus,
and consequently the end, of the inquiry.43  Rather, the inquiry
should focus on the locus of the risk of injury, in this case Clark’s
property, not just on the exact location of the dangerous condi-
tion.44  Although the tree was on the Town’s land, the dangerous
condition threatened to injure Clark’s property or those on it; thus,
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (noting that under the Town’s criminal code “No person . . . shall do or
cause to be done any damage or destroy any tree upon town highways, town parks or
other town property,” and “[a]ny person committing an offense against [§ 5-11] of this
chapter shall be guilty of a violation publishable by a fine not exceeding two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) or by imprisonment for a terms not exceeding fifteen (15) days, or
by both such fine and imprisonment” (quoting CLARKSTOWN, N.Y., CODE §§ 5-11, 5-17
(2005))).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 637.
41. Id. at 638.
42. Id. at 640.
43. Id. at 638.
44. Id.
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the duty imposed upon Clark was a duty to warn guests of that
condition.45
According to the dissent’s analysis, the court should have de-
nied Clark’s motion for summary judgment because there was suffi-
cient evidence for the case to be presented to a jury.46  Judge Kaye
saw Clark’s report to the Town Supervisor as imposing on Clark
himself a duty to warn, for it included statements such as: “the tree
looked to me to be threatening to do some damage to . . . either my
property or the road or power lines,” and “the tree might present a
hazard to [my] house, and that in order for the tree to fall and
strike [my] house it would have fallen straight down the line of the
driveway.”47
The court’s use of the technical location of a hazardous condi-
tion as the basis for determining when landowners have a duty to
warn substantially narrows landowners’ duty of care.  In fact, it im-
poses no duty whatsoever upon landowners with respect to anything
outside the confines of their own property.48  The zone of danger
analysis articulated by Judge Ritter and echoed by Judge Kaye
should be the basis for future cases addressing situations similar to
that in Galindo.49  The appropriate rule for courts to apply should
be that landowners’ duty of care includes warning those on their
property of known dangers on the land without regard to the spe-
cific root of the danger.50  If a known danger which is not easily
observable could likely lead to injury, a duty to warn should fol-
low.51  This test establishes a basis upon which adjacent landowners
can reasonably be assured that guests’ safety will be taken into ac-
count, regardless of where the danger emanates from.  Placing this
“minimal burden” on landowners may save lives.52
In ruling as it did, the Galindo court veered away from previ-
ously established landowner liability standards.53  In its 1976 opin-
45. Id. at 639.
46. Id. at 640.
47. Id. at 639. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 640. But see supra note 7.
49. See Galindo, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Ritter, J., dissenting); Galindo, 2 N.Y.3d at
640.
50. See id.
51. See Galindo, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Ritter, J., dissenting).
52. See Galindo, 2 N.Y.3d at 640 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
53. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233 (1976); Tagle v. Jakob, 97 N.Y.2d 165 (2001).
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ion in Basso v. Miller, the Court of Appeals greatly simplified the
earlier landowner negligence standard by abandoning categories of
plaintiffs.54  Instead, the court devised a single standard of reasona-
bleness: a property owner has the duty to act as a reasonable person
in the maintenance of his land in a reasonably safe condition in
light of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to
others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the
risk of injury.55
In Tagle v. Jakob, the Court of Appeals applied the Basso analy-
sis.56  In Tagle, a landowner leased her property subject to an ease-
ment running through a portion of the backyard.57  The landowner
did not advise the tenant that there were uninsulated electric wires
running through a tree on the easement.58  While climbing the
wired tree, the tenant’s guest touched the wire and was electro-
cuted.59  The injured guest sued the landowner for failure to warn
of the danger of the uninsulated wires.60  The court focused its fact-
specific analysis on whether the wires were readily obvious to the
tenant, concluding that, given the obviousness of the wires, the
landowner had no reason to believe the tenant would not readily
see the hazard.61  Thus, the landowner had no duty to warn.62  This
analysis is in stark contrast to the analysis set forth in Galindo.63  If
the Galindo court had used the Basso analysis, it likely would have
found Clark liable if the damaged tree was not obvious to Galindo.
Abandoning this analysis lessens landowners’ responsibility and
might lead to the wrong result, especially where the possibility of
serious injury is great.
54. See 40 N.Y.2d 233, 239-40 (1976) (removing liability based upon classification
as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser).
55. Id. at 241 (quoting Smith v. Arbaugh’s Rest., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
56. See 97 N.Y. 2d 165, 168 (2001).
57. Id. at 167.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 169.
61. Id. at 170.
62. Id. at 169. See also Galindo, 2 N.Y.3d at 639 (positing that “[i]f a live power line
were dangling precariously over a person’s property, any homeowner — though unable
to eliminate the danger other than by calling the local utility who owns the line —
would warn children to stay away.  If the danger were not open and obvious — perhaps
at night — the owner should warn visitors as well.”)
63. See Galindo, 2 N.Y.3d at 636-38.
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In stark contrast to Basso and Tagle, the Galindo court took the
position that because Clark lacked the requisite control of the adja-
cent property, there was no duty to warn Galindo.64  Looking sim-
ply at control greatly lessens landowners’ responsibility.  A
dangerous condition might encroach so far over onto one’s prop-
erty that the duty to attempt to remedy the situation should be im-
posed.  The damaged tree hanging over Clark’s property is a prime
example.  Although Clark attempted, without response, to notify
the Town of the condition of the tree,65 he should have taken fur-
ther action.  A simple warning to the housekeeper might have
avoided a terrible tragedy.  The facts in this case demonstrate that
Clark had a duty to warn Galindo of the potential danger.  The lack
of response from the Town, coupled with Clark’s statement that “it
looked like there was a possibility it [the tree] would come down,”66
illustrates why Clark had a duty to warn.  As Cardozo stated, “[t]he
query always is whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced to
such a point as to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or
has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become an instru-
ment for good.”67
How are guests protected from injury and property owners
from liability when the law is so unclear?  Although fine lines are
difficult to draw in negligence law, there needs to be a reliable stan-
dard for victims and property owners to rely upon.  The reasonable
person standard may be that reliable standard.  Although tort law is
primarily based in the common law, this is an area where legislative
action may be needed.  A balanced solution that addresses the pro-
tective needs of both landowners and guests should be developed.
64. Id. at 637-38.
65. Id. at 635.
66. Id. at 639.
67. H.R. Moch Co., 247 N.Y. at 168.
